The reactions to the report by solid waste industry constituents varied widely. This mixed response convinced MN OEA leaders that, in order to decide how to move ahead, they needed to conduct a participative forum. They felt that systems thinking and related organizational learning practices could help a group of representatives from different sectors identify leverage points for change and address the social and dynamic complexity inherent in such an intricate system.

Systems thinking tools can provide a vital and sorely missed perspective on the complex matters with which our legislators grapple.

That spring, MN OEA gathered 27 participants, representing citizens, businesses, government, recycling centers, and solid waste processing industries statewide, to think together about Minnesota’s solid waste system. A Blue Ribbon Panel of legislators, industry officials, and community representatives would then recommend legislation based on this group’s suggestions. Participants were asked to be leaders and experimenters, to look beyond their familiar areas of expertise in order to understand the whole system, to adopt a view with a longer time horizon than their organization generally used, and perhaps to reach conclusions that would not necessarily be in their organizations’ best short term interests.

A Historic Opportunity

Systems thinking tools can provide a vital and sorely missed perspective on the complex matters with which our legislators grapple. Although there have been many systemic analyses of public sector issues, the challenge is to discover innovative methods for encouraging public policy making institutions to accept and implement the conclusions that arise from these analyses. At least initially, there may have to be trade offs between being right from a systemic perspective and being effective from a political standpoint.

MN OEA employed a highly participative process to help the working group come to adopt as their own the findings of the solid waste policy report. The facilitators and MNOEA did not direct the participants’work; they simply brought together a capable group of people and provided them with tools for dealing with the complexity of the issues they were asked to address. This “hands-off approach, new for public policy discussions, was a critical factor in the project’s success.

MN OEA also carefully selected participants, identifying the various sectors for representation and soliciting nominations for people “in the trenches” who really understand their industries. The agency excluded registered lobbyists to try to minimize the political element in the process. Final participants were chosen through a voting procedure, based on their potential to see beyond themselves, their knowledge, and their work ethic.

The Participative Process in Action

The process began with an introduction to systems thinking and organizational learning (see “Tools for Change” on p. 8). The facilitator also told participants how different this work would be from their previous experiences, defined the notion of respect, and made explicit expectations about respectful behaviors.

In the nine days the group met, participants engaged in the following activities:

• They used the hexagon technique (see “From Ideas to Variables” by David Kreutzer, THE SYSTEMS THINKER V8N9, November 1997) to identify issues and concerns regarding the solid waste disposal system. Writing their observations on sticky notes and posting them at the front of the room allowed participants to be fully present, incorporate emotional responses as relevant data, separate issues from the individuals who articulated them, and create a complete picture of the system.
• The participants then identified variables and learned the language of causal loops. They worked in small teams to explore the issues represented on the hexagons, using systems archetypes, free form causal looping, and stock and flow diagrams.
• They began and finished each day with a dialogue style check-in/check-out (see “Check-in, Check-out: A Tool for ‘Real’ Conversations” by Fred Kofman, THE SYSTEMS THINKER V5N4, May 1994).Through this process, each participant could voice his or her state of mind, thoughts, and concerns. Sometimes supportive, sometime divisive, check-ins/check-outs and shared luncheons were critical to building trust.
• The participants synthesized the smaller causal loop diagrams into one large causal map, making the relationships across the entire solid waste system visible at a high level.
• They developed options and strategies for moving forward. The group tested these strategies using causal loops and stocks and flows by identifying and considering the unintended side effects of proposed actions.
• Lastly, the group developed recommendations for the Blue Ribbon Panel. As they did so, they identified guiding principles for themselves as well as for the state, such as “We must protect the environment and public health,” “We must reduce waste generation,” and “We must collect better data over time.” They also employed a six-level agreement model to discern how much support each recommendation received from members.

In previous participative processes, this was the point where some participants sat back and waited to see what would happen; others, who disagreed with the majority, worked to undermine the final results; and still others voiced their distrust of the political system to carry out the suggestions. This time, all concerns were considered openly. Most participants came to realize that if they didn’t give the process their best effort, they would be contributing to the self fulfilling prophecy that real change cannot be created within the political system.

Outcomes

In the end, the group made 10 recommendations to the Blue Ribbon Panel, with some suggestions about funding sources. The final report included several causal loop diagrams for explanatory purposes. The group elected representatives to provide context for the report during the presentation to the panel. The panel unanimously accepted most of the recommendations are substantial achievement. A major reason for this consensus was that there commendations were intentionally worded at a fairly high level, with little specificity. Nonetheless, the groundwork for this level of agreement was laid during the time the working group had spent together, talking about their assumptions and concerns, from their vantage points within the system.

Interestingly, one of the group’s recommendations was that they continue to meet periodically to assess how the system has changed and whether the actions taken on the recommendations worked the way they had anticipated, and to tackle some of the more difficult issues. Participants felt it was important to build on the foundation they had created, both from the content of their work and the relationships they had established.

They also expressed cautious optimism about the ability of the political system to act on these recommendations while preserving their original intent. As the participants move forward, their exposure to and growing understanding of systemic processes and group learning tools should contribute to improving the political process.

Governmental bodies like MNOEA play a vital role in protecting vulnerable resources, and yet they face staggering levels of complexity. Ultimately, we hope to see an increasing use of these tools in the areas where they have the most value in the stewardship of our societal systems.

The post Minnesota Takes the Long View of Its Solid Waste System appeared first on The Systems Thinker.

A New Threat

SARS emerged this year as a previously unknown virus that is particularly virulent—it is easily spread and can be deadly. Because it kills approximately 15 percent of those infected—the rate is even higher among the elderly—health officials around the world have taken strong steps to mitigate the epidemic and to prevent the public from panicking. In Canada, the great majority of cases were concentrated in Toronto, the country’s largest city and capital of the province of Ontario. From its first news release on March 14 to the latest daily updates on the situation, the Province of Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long-term Care (MoH, the main governmental department responsible for dealing with the outbreak) sought to inform the public about the progress of the disease and the measures taken to deal with it. Now that the outbreak in Toronto has been suppressed, we can appreciate the impact of this information on public perceptions of and reactions to this health crisis.

A clear and rigorous way to report and interpret data about the spread of infection would help people accurately assess the level of risk.

One element of the daily updates was the summary of relevant statistics on the number of cases of the disease. In keeping with the WHO’s style of reporting on epidemics, the MoH bulletins reported cumulative numbers, in this case the total numbers of probable and suspected cases and deaths to date. Each day, the media reported this cumulative total; some later reports also mentioned cumulative recoveries (referred to as discharges).

I can attest that it was difficult to know how bad the situation was becoming from the raw information being offered. Reporters did little to interpret the data, instead publishing stories about the public’s and their own reactions to the outbreak, to the problems of living under quarantine, and to the few cases of people breaking quarantine. The use of cumulative numbers of cases, discharges, and deaths—numbers that can only increase until the epidemic has run its course—was often confusing and misunderstood. Such information gave no sense of the progress of the disease for example, whether the numbers of cases or deaths per day were increasing, staying the same, or decreasing.

The MoH did eventually include the category of “active” cases in its reports, which gave the public a sense of how many people were currently infected. But confusion was heightened by occasional instances in which the MoH reported tens or even hundreds of potential cases with no clear indication of whether these numbers fell into the active or cumulative category. For the public, this confusion led to the panicked buying of high-quality respiratory masks, cancellation of several large conventions, reduced participation in social activities like sports and cultural events, and a slump in restaurant dining and tourism, with economic side-effects that are still being felt.

A Simple Model

In such public health crises, a simple stock and flow model could clarify the situation (see “Stocks and Flows of the SARS Epidemic”). The stocks would be the “Active” cases— “Probable” and “Suspect.” Their principal inflows would be “New Cases” of each sort discovered each day. The outflows would be the number of “Deaths” (a small figure; the total number in Toronto is 24 as of this writing) and the number of people who recovered from the disease each day, reported as “Discharges.” A final flow from “Suspect” to “Probable” cases would take care of the clinical difference between the two classes.

This model would define the primary data needed to represent different aspects of the outbreak:

• Its onset and its gathering speed with the number of new cases per day.
• Its control and eventual suppression when the number of new cases stays at zero for 20 days (twice the incubation period) and the number of active cases dwindles to zero.
• The requirements for treatment resources based on the number of active cases.
• The treatment success rate as shown by the number of discharges compared to the number of deaths.

All of this information is much more difficult, if not impossible, to assess directly from the current data stream provided by the standard reporting practices. It is not clear what part these difficulties in assessment played in the WHO’s unexpected and unprecedented decision to issue a travel advisory for Toronto (since rescinded). Nevertheless, confusion about the success that public health authorities were having in controlling SARS was certainly part of the issue and continues to inspire efforts to remove the stain on the city’s reputation as a safe place to visit and conduct business.

STOCKS AND FLOWS OF THE SARS EPIDEMIC

In a public health crisis, a simple stock and flow model could clarify the situation by distinguishing between the stock variables (“Suspect” and “Probable”), which give a snapshot of the situation at any given moment, and the flow (or rate) variables, which explain the day-to-day variations in the picture. For more information about stock and flow diagrams, go to www.pegasuscom.com/stockflow.html.

The discovery of a few suspect cases of SARS in Toronto on May 22 and the extension of the voluntary quarantine to a few hundred people demonstrate another element of the dynamic structure—potential but undetected cases. This category exists because of the lack of a precise test for the disease. Without an objective measure of who does or doesn’t have SARS, healthcare workers must make judgments, for example, that an elderly patient suffering from postoperative pneumonia does not have SARS, followed by a realization several days later that this patient does indeed have the disease. Unfortunately, this kind of significant delay in the discovery of problematic cases can perpetuate the epidemic and lead to large social and economic costs.

Using a simple stock and flow model to depict the course of future epidemics could better inform the public so they could make wise individual choices about how best to respond to the health threat.

Wise Choices

This model or a slightly more elaborate version could have reduced some of the confusion surrounding the raw, cumulative data reported during the outbreak. It would have clarified the important distinction between the stock variables, which give a snapshot of the situation at any given moment, and the flow variables, which explain the day-to-day variations in the picture. The usefulness of the stock and flow model is validated by the most recent news reports on the final success of the campaign. These reports include a graphical representation of the number of active cases. The diagram shows a downward trend at a varying rate since the peak of SARS cases on April 18 to May 15, the date of this writing. Such a graphic goes far in highlighting the pattern over time of the outbreak.

Finally, the stock and flow model would identify the important variables—the flows (“New Cases,” “Discharges,” and “Deaths”)—that have to be managed in order to control the outbreak and deal with its economic and social side-effects. For example, an increase in “New Cases” that is not soon matched by an increase in “Discharges” could be a signal to increase resources for treatment (“Discharges”) and quarantine (“New Cases”). Reports of decreasing numbers of active cases should be accompanied by estimates of the probable numbers of deaths or, more positively, by estimates of the probable number of recoveries so as not to give the false impression that success in suppressing the outbreak means no more casualties.

Toronto, like Vietnam before it and more recently Singapore, has shown that SARS can be contained by vigorous efforts to identify and isolate patients (in hospital or in quarantine). Using a simple stock and flow model to depict the course of future epidemics—such as the summertime threat of West Nile virus in North America—could better inform the public so they could make wise individual choices about how best to respond to the health threat.

R. Joel Rahn is recently retired as a professor in the Department of Operations and Decision Systems at Laval University. He has been active in teaching and research in system dynamics for over a quarter century.

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According to Colvin, mounting evidence shows that the standard model of two or three weeks of vacation a year doesn’t work for employees on the leading edge of the new knowledge- based economy. Because of advances in technology, numerous professionals are now “on call” around the clock— negotiating deals, handling clients’ problems, and managing projects from wherever they happen to be. These individuals often supervise business tasks while purportedly out of the office, and squeeze in appearances at their children’s sports events between work-related presentations. Company requirements for “face time,” set schedules, and limited days off may be appropriate for those who must perform bounded tasks at a particular place and time. But such restrictions may actually undermine the performance of workers responsible for fulfilling more open- ended or creative functions.

Blurred Boundaries

As shown in “How Vacation Policies Undermine Knowledge Work,” as the amount of knowledge-intensive work performed by employees increases, the level of control that employers exert over how, when, and where work is accomplished declines (R1). A manager would be ill served by demanding that a writer produce 500 words of creative copy an hour instead of agreeing that an article be completed by a certain deadline. Without rigid controls or oversight, workers assume greater accountability for fulfilling their responsibilities. By giving them autonomy, clear goals, and accountability for accomplishing a high-quality work product on time and within budget, managers free employees to increase their capacity to produce results.

HOW VACATION POLICIES UNDERMINE KNOWLEDGE WORK

By giving them greater autonomy, managers free knowledge workers to increase their capacity to produce results (R1). But standard vacation policies contradict this sense of accountability, ultimately undermining productivity (B2).

By its nature, knowledge work results in the blurring of the boundaries between work and personal time, because responsibilities don’t end and ideas don’t cease to percolate once someone leaves the office (B2). But a consultant who has spent three months putting in 70-hour weeks on a project is likely to be increasingly ineffective— and resentful—if company policy requires her to squeeze much needed recovery time from her limited vacation allotment. This kind of administrative control can undermine the motivation of even the most dedicated contributor.

So, what is the alternative?

According to Colvin, “No allotted vacation time. When you go on vacation is up to you. You’re a grownup; you’re responsible for most decisions affecting your job performance; now you’re responsible for this one too.” In this scenario, people would stop thinking about vacation time as an entitlement or restriction and instead focus on balancing their work and personal needs themselves. Abuses of the privilege would be revealed through performance shortfalls. But Colvin holds that, for most employees, eliminating allotted vacation time would give them a sense of ownership for their own work product—leading to greater creativity and productivity.

Janice Molloy is managing editor of THE SYSTEMS THINKER.

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